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Police Powers for Sale:
Red-Light Enforcement Sold to the Foreign Bidder
Andrea Franklin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Red-light cameras have been popping up all over major intersections and headlining news stories nationwide. Undoubtedly, public
outcry over this relatively innovative technology may be rooted in the
conspiracy theorist’s Orwellian “Big Brother” notion that the government monitors the citizen and invades his personal freedoms; however, on a less-exaggerated notion, public outcry may be driven by the
deep-seated belief that this new technology is inherently wrong.
Many violators who received citations have challenged the constitutionality of the whole red-light-camera program, but few, if any, have
1
had any luck in the courtroom. Judges hearing appeals of violations
have frequently disregarded statutory parameters and simply dis2
missed any disputed violations. Since the introduction of automated
*
This comment was authored by Andrea M. Franklin, a third-year law student at Florida
International University College of Law. Special thanks to: Professor John Stack for encouraging
me to continue researching after I thought the constitutionality of the red-light cameras was the
end of the legal discussion on this topic; the FIU Law Review Editorial Board, Courtney Walter,
Cristina Neuman, Jennifer Soberal, and Erin Auble, for their relentless dedication to furthering
the development and academic success of FIU Law; and, finally, to my family and friends for
putting up with me, even when I made it difficult to do so.
1
See, e.g., Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding state
did not violate plaintiff’s right to equal protection merely because cameras were installed at
some intersections); Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540 (E.D.
Tenn. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s right to procedural due process was not violated by a $50 civil
penalty for red-light-camera violation); Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding state’s imposition of vicarious liability on car owners, but not on car
dealerships or lessors, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d
181 (D.C. 2007) (finding state’s statutory presumption of liability did not impinge on car owner’s
right to due process).
2
See generally Jackelyn Barnard, Red Light Cameras Have Drivers Explaining Themselves
in Courtht [sic], FIRST COAST NEWS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/
local/article/234758/3/Think-Youve-Heard-it-All-A-Visit-to-Red-Light-Camera-Court; Brooke
Edwards, California Courts Throwing Out Red Light Camera Tickets, VICTORVILLE DAILY PRESS
(Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.vvdailypress.com/news/throwing-25536-california-tickets.html; Jane
Musgrave, About 50 People Have Red-Light Camera Tickets Dismissed in West Palm and Palm
Springs, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 18, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-01-18/news/fl-palm-
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traffic detection systems, also known as traffic infraction detectors,
including red-light cameras, a flurry of issues have arisen surrounding
3
this relatively undeveloped and unarticulated legal debate.
The precedential case law is scarce and sparse around the entire
nation. Some states have banned the use of such automated systems;
others have implemented programs utilizing the systems. In almost
every state where the systems have been implemented, petitioners
have raised constitutional issues, albeit rather unsuccessfully, based on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, Miranda rights
and the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and various privacy issues stemming from state law. Such claims
rarely, if ever, prevail. Legal scholars and political decision-makers
have only recently begun to focus on the impact of these systems, especially in terms of legality and public policy.
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration has published Red Light Camera Systems: Operational
Guidelines, but these guidelines are not binding and are merely sug4
gestive. Different states have exercised their police powers to enact
legislation, which contain some uniformity with the federal guidelines
5
but also contain particular regional specifications.

red-light-cameras-folo-20110118_1_red-light-camera-tickets-red-light-intersections-last-year;
Associated Press, Judge Dismisses Nearly 300 Red-Light Camera Tickets in San Diego (Sept. 5,
2001), available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/090501/upd_075-6389.shtml; 292 Red-Light
Tickets Voided in Suit Over Automated Cameras, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2001, § News, at 12. But see
Dan Tracy & Scott Powers, Red-Light Camera Laws Enforced Erratically When It Comes to Right
Turns, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 14, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-0514/news/os-red-light-cameras-project-20110513_1_red-light-camera-tickets-motorists-appealyellow-lights.
3
See generally Robin Miller, J.D., Annotation, Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems, 26
A.L.R. 6TH 179 (2007).
4
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., RED LIGHT CAMERA SYSTEMS:
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, Jan. 2005, available at http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/
redlight/cameras/fhwasa05002/fhwasa05002.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES].
5
Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-52-110, -111 (2005) (permitting red light cameras for
specific reasons, such as school zones or railroad crossings); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4110.5(2)(g) (2004) (permitting cameras within a school zone, residential neighborhood, or along
a street bordering a municipal park); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-809 (2011) (permitting
cameras within a school zone or highway in a residential district); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
484.910 (2009) (permitting only handheld automated infraction detectors, such as radar detectors, or automated detectors installed within law enforcement vehicle or facility), with N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:4-103.1 (2002) (prohibiting photo-radar enforcement); W. VA. CODE § 17C-6-7a (2007)
(prohibiting “traffic law photo-monitoring device”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.02(3) (2005) (prohibiting “photo radar speed detection”).
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6

Specifically, Florida’s Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act authorizes
the use of automated traffic infraction detectors, but the Statute’s
delegation to local authorities is broad and vaguely permissive. Prior
to the enactment of the Mark Wandall Act, in order to issue a traffic
citation, a traffic enforcement officer was required to personally issue
a citation for a violation that occurred in the presence of an officer;
furthermore, the alleged violator was required to sign and accept the
7
citation, constituting service and notice. Now, since the Act allows
issuance of a citation without personal service and/or in the presence
of a traffic enforcement officer, most local governments that implemented red-light cameras have done so by outsourcing the operations
8
and monitoring of the automated systems.
For example, the City of North Miami Beach instituted its Red
Light Camera Program by outsourcing to an Arizona-based company
who monitored violations through the use of road sensors and photographs; the City retained the right to review these citations, but for the
most part, company technicians exercise substantial discretion in issu9
ing a citation. Notwithstanding whether the photographs have been
reviewed by a traffic enforcement officer, a citation is issued based on
10
the vehicle’s registration information. Overall, this delegation to private entities, which are usually located outside the state, has been the
11
growing trend for local enforcement of traffic violations.

6

FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010).
See Letter from Charlie Crist, Att’y Gen., to Samuel Goren, City Att’y, Pembroke Pines,
Fla. (July 12, 2005), AGO 2005-41, available at www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/
printview/CE01BE293FCEEA208525703C00720344. [hereinafter Letter from Charlie Crist].
8
See, e.g., Memorandum from Louis Moore, Dir., Purchasing & Materials Mgmt., to City
Council, St. Petersburg, Fla., (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.stpetecameras.org/home/stpete-rlc-contract-with-ats [hereinafter Memorandum from Louis Moore]; CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM, CITY OF MIAMI, Contract By and Between City of Miami & Am.
Traffic Solutions, Inc. to Furnish, Install, Operate, and Maintain a Traffic Infraction Detector
Program, Sept. 21, 2010, available at http://www.stpetecameras.org/home/st-pete-rlc-contract-with-ats
[hereinafter City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract]; ORANGE CNTY. PUB. WORKS DEP’T,
TRAFFIC ENG’G DIV., Orange Cnty. Gov’t Florida Red-Light Running Pilot Project Summary,
Draft Final Rep. Submitted to Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Nov. 2008 [hereinafter Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008].
9
Letter from V. Lynn Whitfield, City Att’y, N. Miami, to Mayor & City Council, (May 17,
2011), available at http://www.northmiamifl.gov/Docs/AgendasMinutes/TABF05172011.pdf.
10 See discussion infra note 12.
11 See, e.g., Letter from Edmund T. Baxa, Jr., Foley & Lardner LLP, to Byron W. Brooks,
AICP, Chief Admin. Officer, City of Orlando (Dec. 24, 2007), RFP 07-594, Request for Proposal
for Red Light Violation Cameras and Citation System (on file with author); Letter from P.J.
Lynch, LaserCraft Representative & Negotiator, to Althea Pemsel, M.A., C.P.M., Purchasing
Agent III, Orlando, Fla., RFP 07-594, Red Light Violation Cameras and Citation System, Protest
Responses (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from James D. Tuton, President, Am.
Traffic Solutions, to Jon Mead, C.P.M., Dir. Purchasing, Orlando, Fla., (Dec. 10, 2007), Notice of
Protest, RFP No. 07-594, Red Light Violation Cameras and Citation System (on file with author).
7
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This type of “outsourcing” of law enforcement has regarded these
private firms as another arm of the executive branch. Such privatization of law enforcement poses substantial legal issues of municipality
authority and administrative agency discretion.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Despite the flurry of legal challenges to the automated systems,
courts have been relatively reluctant to find the cameras unconstitu12
tional.
Nationwide, judges have generally rejected any claims of consti13
tutional violations. In theory, the judicial trend against the unconstitutionality of the automated systems is indeed well-founded on and in
accordance with the respective jurisprudence of the invoked provisions in any given constitutionally based challenge.
A. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause prevents state action that infringes
on a person’s right to be “free from invidious discrimination in statu14
tory classifications and other governmental activity” and requires
15
that “all similarly situated persons be treated in a similar manner.”
These oft-cited “catchphrases” are the touchstone earmarks of the
Equal Protection’s constitutional requirements. As such, the Court
has developed a judicial framework for adjudicating constitutional
challenges in a somewhat consistent, straightforward manner to pro16
mote clear-cut application.
Essentially, when a statutory classification involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, any constitutional challenge to that
12 See, e.g., Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding state
did not violate plaintiff’s right to equal protection merely because cameras were installed at
some intersections); Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540 (E.D.
Tenn. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s right to procedural due process was not violated by a $50 civil
penalty for red-light-camera violation); Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding state’s imposing vicarious liability on car owners, but not car dealerships
or lessors, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C.
2007) (finding state’s statutory presumption of liability did not impinge on car owner’s right to
due process).
13 See sources cited supra note 12.
14 Akbar, 2009 WL 3055322, at 3 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)).
15 Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
16 See generally, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (requiring strict-scrutiny standard
to cases involving classifications based on race or national origin); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (requiring strict-scrutiny standard to cases involving a fundamental right); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring strict-scrutiny standard to cases involving racial classification); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (requiring intermediate-scrutiny standard to sex-based
classifications).

2012]

Police Powers for Sale

141

classification must overcome the rational-basis test—the least intrusive and most deferential of the Equal Protection’s standards of re17
view. Therefore, most classifications will pass constitutional muster
under the Equal Protection Clause’s rational-basis test—unless, of
course, the statutory classification is wholly irrational or completely
18
unreasonable.
Based on this framework in the context of red-light camera constitutional challenges, courts have expressly denied the possibility of
heightened scrutiny for red-light camera programs: 1) “[t]he freedom
19
to run a red light is not a fundamental right,” and 2) “individuals
whose vehicles have been photographed violating the red light ordi20
nance” are not members of a suspect class.
Accordingly, the appropriate standard for red-light camera challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause is the rational-basis test;
thus, the issue presented is whether the use of automated traffic infraction detectors is rationally related to a legitimate government in21
terest.
In Idris v. City of Chicago, plaintiffs claimed the city’s automated
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution because the red-light program provided a defense for car
dealerships and manufacturers, yet not to other vehicle owners, “i.e.,
the defense that a car caught running a red light was formally leased
to another person creates a legislative classification that ‘lack[s] any
22
rational basis, and render[s] the ordinance invalid on its face.’”
In Idris, the city’s ordinance provided that a car dealership or
manufacturer could not be vicariously liable for a lessee’s violation,
whereas other vehicle owners could be vicariously liable for the violation, notwithstanding whether the car’s owner was the actual driver at
23
the time of the alleged violation captured by the automated system.
The Idris court applied the rational-basis test for the constitutional challenge since plaintiffs did not, nor could they, argue for
24
heightened scrutiny based on a suspect class or a fundamental right.

17

Id.
See generally, Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding rational-basis test was the
least demanding of the Equal Protection tests); Ry Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949) (finding rational-basis test for most classifications appropriate).
19 Mills v. City of Springfield, No. 2:10–CV–04036–NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *6 (W.D. Mo.
2010).
20 Id. at *7.
21 See generally id.; Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Idris
v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
22 Idris, 2008 WL 182248.
23 See id.
24 Id.
18
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Accordingly, the court acknowledged the standard that plaintiffs face
in challenging a red light camera program based on the Equal Protection Clause: “plaintiff[s] attempting to invalidate a statutory classification under the rational basis test face an uphill battle and must ‘nega25
tive every conceivable basis which might support it.’”
In a similarly unsuccessful claim, plaintiffs in Akbar v. Daley challenged the use of automated traffic infraction detectors installed in
one part of the city yet not in another part—essentially, an allegedly
unconstitutional classification between persons driving in the downtown area of the city and persons driving in the city but outside the
26
downtown area. The Akbar court characterized the purported classification as “problematic” because persons in both classifications are
27
“constantly . . . in flux.”
Moreover, since Equal Protection challenges to statutorily created classifications are generally concerned with “legislation whose
purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable
28
classes,” plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a constitutionally infirm classification since a driver’s classification “may be discrete and identifiable
at one moment in time . . . but would change from moment to moment”; thus, a driver could “easily transition from protected class to
29
discriminated class by driving a few blocks.”
After the Akbar court rejected plaintiffs’ classification of drivers
affected by the automated systems, the court nonetheless noted plaintiffs’ significant burden even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ classification claim: unless the municipal ordinance involves members of a suspect class or affects a fundamental right, the municipality need only
30
meet the rational basis standard in order to justify its actions.
Subtly yet distinctively, the Akbar court wholly dismissed the possibility that a suspect class or a fundamental right could possibly exist
31
in this case.

25 See id. at *4 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
26 Akbar, 2009 WL 3055322, at *3 (citing Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591,
601 (2008); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.”).
27 Id.
28 Id. (emphasis added by court) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
29 Id. (citing Enquist, 553 U.S. at 601 and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 60
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.”).
30 Id. at 4.
31 See id. at 6.
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Without a constitutional challenge based on a suspect class or a
fundamental right, plaintiffs will almost inevitably face the heavy burden of showing that these automated systems are not rationally based
on the state’s interest in preventing car crashes caused by red-light
running. Accordingly, the rational-basis test is essentially the “roadblock” to a plaintiff’s constitutional challenge based on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
So long as the municipality provides a rational basis for implementing the use of automated infraction detectors, its actions following therefrom will remain relatively unscathed by the necessities of
the Equal Protection Clause. The municipality may assert its “rational
basis” for red-light cameras without even calling in its legal team: redlight running causes accidents and is illegal. Even if the simplicity of
32
this basis may actually be nothing more than smoke and mirrors,
judges are relatively unwilling to delve into the complexities of traffic
33
engineering and statistics.

32 See generally Christine Vendel, Police Study Suggests Red-Light Cameras Don’t Add To
Safety, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/
2012/01/23/3387905/kc-police-study-suggests-red-light.html; James Baxter, Red-Light Cameras
Do Not Reduce Right Angle Crashes, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N BLOG (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://blog.motorists.org/red-light-cameras-do-not-reduce-right-angle-crashes/ (last visited Dec.
22, 2012); Red Light Cameras Linked To Crashes: Red Light Cameras Used To Nab Drivers Who
Disobey Traffic Signals Can Lead To More Accidents and Injuries, According To Researchers at
The University of South Florida College of Public Health, THE CALGARY HERALD (Mar. 14,
2008),
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=b8a238d6-ab4b-401a-87c2cfd524789502; Red-Light Cameras Increase Accidents: 5 Studies That Prove It, NAT’L MOTORISTS
ASS’N BLOG (Jan. 8, 2008), http://blog.motorists.org/red-light-cameras-increase-accidents-5studies-that-prove-it/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); Associated Press, Critics Point To Downside of
Red Light Monitoring Cameras - Rear-End Accidents, (Sept. 26, 2004), available at
http://production.daily-jeff.com/local%20news/2004/09/27/critics-point-to-downside-of-red-lightmonitoring-cameras-rear-end-accidents. But see Associated Press, Study Finds Red Light Cameras Cut Fatal Crashes (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.nola.com/traffic/index.ssf/2011/02/
study_finds_red_light_cameras.html; Chuck Squatriglia, Study Says Red Light Cameras Save
Lives, WIRED.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2011/02/study-says-red-lightcameras-save-lives/; Nedra Pickler, Researchers Find Big Drop in Speeding After Cameras Deployed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 1, 2002, available at Associated Press Archive.
33 See, e.g., Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Is it rational to fine
the owner rather than the driver? Certainly so. A camera can show reliably which cars and
trucks go through red lights but is less likely to show who was driving. . . . A system of photographic evidence reduces the costs of law enforcement and increases the proportion of all traffic
offenses that are detected; these benefits can be achieved only if the owner is held responsible.”);
Mills v. City of Springfield, No. 2:10–CV–04036–NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *6 (W.D. Mo. 2010)
(“Clearly, a legislative body could find that improved surveillance and enforcement of red light
violations would result in fewer accidents.”); Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Because Defendant has presented possible reasons that would justify the
classification and Plaintiff has failed to ‘allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of
rationality,’ Plaintiff's equal protection challenge must fail.”) (citing Wroblewski v. City of
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1992); Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715
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Therefore, plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of automated traffic infraction detectors must establish that the rational basis
of traffic safety can somehow outweigh an individual’s interest in paying the civil penalty for an infraction or appealing the authenticity of
photographic evidence of an alleged red-light violation. Such an argument has not been made; arguably, such an argument cannot be
made because the safety of drivers carries substantially more weight
than any single individual interest.
B.

Due Process

Generally, based on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
Mathews v. Eldridge, in order to determine whether a state’s procedures adequately provide due process, a trial court will apply the
three-prong Mathews balancing test: 1) whether an individual’s interest is affected by state action; 2) whether the procedure used increases
the risk of erroneously depriving this interest, and if so, whether an
alternative or additional procedural safeguard yields a more probable
value; and 3) whether an additional safeguard imposes a burden on
34
the state’s fiscal and administrative interest.
Although figuratively referred to as a “balancing test,” where the
individual’s interest is weighed against the government’s interest, the
notion of balancing in this context is essentially placing a mouse and
an elephant on opposite ends of a playground seesaw.
In Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., plaintiffs filed suit
against Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., a private company, as well as the
35
city contracting with the company. Plaintiffs claimed the city’s redlight-camera program violated their constitutional right to due proc36
ess. Without reaching the issue of the actual red light camera system
underlying the claim, the Tennessee appellate court addressed the appropriate standard applied for such a claim:
In order to state a claim for denial of procedural due process, a
plaintiff must first establish that she has been deprived of a property or liberty interest. In this case, the property interest at issue
presumably lies in the $50 ‘civil penalty’ that was assessed against
37
[plaintiffs].

(M.D.N.C. 2003) (“Defendants [the City] have put forth significant evidence indicating that the
goal of the ordinance is to promote public safety.”).
34 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
35 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.
2008).
36 Id. at *3.
37 Id. at *4 (citing Bd. of Regents of State College. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)).

2012]

Police Powers for Sale

145

Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the violations violated their right to due process, finding that the plaintiffs’
purported property interest could not outweigh the state’s interest in
38
traffic safety.
Similarly unsuccessful, plaintiffs in the District of Columbia
claimed a due process violation based on the state’s statutory scheme
39
for issuance and appeal of citations issued by the automated systems.
In Agomo v. Fenty, the red-light-camera program in question
bears substantial similarity to the general standardized approach to
issuance of citations in most states that have permitted the use of
automated systems: based on the owner-responsibility scheme, the
owner of the vehicle received a notice of the infraction captured by
the cameras; the notice informs the vehicle owner that he shall be liable for payment of the citation unless he could provide evidence that
his vehicle was in the custody or control of another person; further,
the notice must provide the date, time, location, license plate number,
and the photo images showing the violation occurred; and, after receiving the notice, the vehicle owner could request a hearing to appeal
the citation; however, failure to pay or otherwise appeal constituted an
40
admission of liability.
Challenging this standard approach, plaintiffs in Agomo alleged a
due process violation based on the “presumption of guilt” in the
41
owner-responsibility scheme. [Although not addressed in the court’s
opinion, plaintiffs’ use of the word “guilty,” in and of itself, is misplaced. The issue of civil liability versus criminal guilt is a dispositive
distinction and is discussed in greater detail below.]
In order to determine whether plaintiffs’ due process rights had
been violated by the red-light-camera program, the court found that,
under the Mathews balancing test, plaintiffs’ due process rights were
not violated because of a failure to provide notice or a deprivation of
42
the opportunity to be heard. The court explained that “(a) the plaintiffs received notices of infraction in advance of any determinations of

38

Id.
Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. 2007).
40 See, e.g., City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; AMERICAN
TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, Contract Between City of Ocoee & Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc. Pertaining
to Red Light Running Camera Enforcement System, July 23, 2010 [hereinafter City of Ocoee,
Am. Traffic Solutions Contract]; AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, Contract Between City of Ft.
Lauderdale & Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., July 7, 2010 [hereinafter City of Ft. Lauderdale, Am.
Traffic Solutions Contract].
41 Agomo, 916 A.2d at 188.
42 Id. at 190.
39

146

FIU Law Review

[8:137

liability, (b) that the notices contained an accurate identification of the
43
vehicle, and (c) a clear description of the asserted violation.”
The Agomo court noted that the plaintiffs’ due process challenge
was not based on the procedure for issuance and appeal of a citation,
but rather that the program “instead creates a statutory presumption
of liability, whereby the identity of the driver is irrelevant, and that
this system therefore violates due process and conflicts with the requirements in other sections of the traffic code that require the iden44
tity of the driver to be proved before liability can be assessed.” Ultimately, the court found that the statute created a rebuttable presumption of vicarious liability and, accordingly, noted that “the Supreme Court has long held that on their face, systems of vicarious liability that impose civil liability are not contrary to the notions of due
45
process.”
The Agomo court referred to the plaintiff’s interest as a “modest
fine,” whereas the government emphatically asserted its interest in
46
preventing traffic accidents and ensuring safety on its roadways. This
notion of balancing interests is commonly and consistently invoked in
courts nationwide. Since the public outcry against the red light programs has focused on the individual’s rights, judges could consistently
and steadfastly reject individual constitutional challenges.
C.

Civil Versus Criminal Offenses

Since a state may exercise its police power to regulate and maintain traffic safety, a state may also exercise its power to identify conduct threatening traffic safety and to characterize such conduct as a
civil or criminal offense. Notwithstanding the traditional common-law
principles of criminal law, a municipal code infraction may constitute a
criminal offense in one state yet constitute a civil offense in another.
Therefore, the cases arising from statutory implementation of redlight cameras vary markedly nationwide based on whether the enabling legislation defines a red-light violation as criminal or civil in nature.
In the context of automated traffic-infraction systems, the distinction between a civil and a criminal penalty is crucially determinative,
insofar as such a distinction variedly implicates different constitutional requirements. This civil-criminal distinction is crucial because
“[i]f the penalty is indeed criminal, then a panoply of federal constitu43
44
45
46

Id.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 193.
Id.
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tional rights, including rights to confrontation and rights against self47
incrimination, arise.” Basically, whether an infraction captured by a
red-light camera constitutes a civil or criminal offense determines the
nature and extent of the process due to the alleged violator.
Generally, municipal code citations, such as parking tickets, are
classified as civil in nature and, thus, municipalities “need not provide
the heightened procedural protections required by the Fifth, Sixth,
48
and Eighth Amendments” of the Constitution. However, a traffic
citation, such as a moving violation, may be classified as a criminal
offense and, as such, implicate the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s protection from self-crimination, the Sixth Amendment’s right
to confront one’s accusers, and the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
49
of cruel and unusual punishment.
Upon receiving citations for violations captured by red-light
cameras, petitioners in Shavitz v. City of High Point challenged a city
ordinance implementing “traffic control photographic systems” au50
thorized by state legislation. The enabling act permitting such an
ordinance required that violations detected by photographic systems
“be deemed a noncriminal violation for which a civil penalty of fifty
51
dollars ($50.00) shall be assessed. . . .”
In determining whether monies collected for violations captured
by red-light cameras constituted a criminal or civil penalty, the Shavitz
court dismissed the argument that such a distinction could be based
on whether the ordinance referred to the $50.00 assessment as a “fine”
52
or a “penalty.” The court found the more significant analysis must
53
require more than the labels attached to the violation. Accordingly,
the court emphasized: “The crux of the distinction lies in the nature of
the offense committed, and not in the method employed by the mu54
nicipality to collect fines for the commission of the offense.”
Nonetheless, the Shavitz court disregarded as “immaterial” the
fact that a violation of the red-light ordinance was also a violation of
55
the state statute, which provided that red-light running was unlawful.
Moreover, the court found that, notwithstanding whether the violation
is punishable as an infraction, subject to state penalty, or as a civil as47

Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.

2008).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

City of Creve Coeur v. Nottebrok, 356 S.W.3d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2011).
See generally Williams, 2008 WL 782540.
Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 728 (citing Cauble v. Asheville, 271 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1980)).
Id. at 715.
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sessment, subject to city penalty, “monetary payments are nevertheless
‘imposed to deter future violations and to extract retribution from the
56
violator’ for [his] transgression.”
Ultimately, the Shavitz court held the $50.00 assessment consti57
tuted a civil penalty. In contrast to the majority of courts determining the proper distinction of a given violation, the Shavitz court’s
characterization of the distinction between criminal and civil penalties
was seemingly result-driven, considering the state’s constitution required municipalities to allocate a portion of the proceeds of civil
58
penalties to the state’s educational system.
Notwithstanding the anomalous Shavitz analysis, the majority of
cases identifying the distinction between civil and criminal offenses
invoke the oft-cited Supreme Court analysis in Kennedy v. Mendoza59
Martinez. In order to determine whether the penalty for photocaptured, red-light infractions is civil or criminal, courts have applied
what has been referred to as the “Mendoza-Martinez” factors: 1)
whether the penalty “involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; 2)
whether such penalty has “historically been regarded as punishment”;
3) whether it depends on a “finding of scienter”; 4) whether it operates
to “promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence”; 5) whether the penalized conduct is “already a crime”; 6)
whether the penalty has “an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected”; and 7) whether it “appears excessive in rela60
tion to the alternative purpose assigned.”
Considering these factors in order to determine whether the
sanction imposed for photo-captured infraction is for a civil or criminal violation, the court in Mills v. City of Springfield found that the
red-light sanction did not “impose a physical restraint but merely a
monetary penalty” and that such penalty “does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative dis61
ability or restraint.” In swiftly glossing over the first and second
Mendoza-Martinez inquiries, the court found that the penalty imposed

56

Id. (citing North Carolina Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Moore, 614 S.E.2d 504, 517 (N.C. 2005)).
Id. at 716-17.
58 Id. at 724.
59 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); City of
Creve Couer v. Nottebrok, 356 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2011); Mills v. City of Springfield, No. 2:10–CV–04036–NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *8 (W.D. Mo. 2010); Kilper v. City of Arnold, No. 4:08cv0267 TCM, 2009 WL 2208404, at *13 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Mendenhall v. City of
Akron, Nos. 5:06 CV 139, 5:06 CV 154, 2008 WL 7484179, at *3 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
60 Mills, 2010 WL 3526208, at *8 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
61 Mills, 2010 WL 3526208, at *9 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 86 (2003)).
57
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was a “mere $100 fine,” and that “[m]oney penalties have not histori63
cally been viewed as punishment.”
In terms of the other Mendoza-Martinez factors, the inquiry as to
whether the sanction will “promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence” is the “lone factor that cuts in favor
64
of [plaintiffs] as to suggest that the ordinance is criminal in nature.”
Nonetheless, the “mere presence of a [deterrent] purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence ‘may serve civil as
65
well as criminal goals.’” Furthermore, according to the Mills court,
because such sanctions do not require a showing of scienter, the mere
66
penalty cannot reasonably be intended as retribution.
In considering the “alternative purpose” inquiry of the MendozaMartinez factors, the Mills court exercised judicial restraint by deferring to the legislature: “[c]learly, a legislative body could find that improved surveillance and enforcement of red light violations would
67
result in fewer accidents.” Nevertheless, in the court’s view, even if
the use of red-light cameras does not actually promote its purpose, the
sanction is not deemed punitive merely because it lacks a perfect or
68
even close fit. Accordingly, the Mills court found the use of traffic
infraction detectors is “rationally connected to the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of reducing traffic accidents at traffic light intersec69
tions.”
The Mills court’s gloss-over of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, and
its characterization of the “mere” penalty and the “mere” fact that it
lacks a perfect, or even close, fit to its purpose of promoting public
safety, are clear indicators of the court’s inclination towards legislative
70
deference in the context of challenges to the use of red-light camera.
Arguably, this trend reflects the underlying notion of judicial restraint,
wherein courts have been consistently reluctant to second-guess the
legislature’s decision to implement automated traffic infraction detectors.
However, does this judicial trend necessarily assert that automated systems are here to stay? Insofar as the civil-criminal distinction, legislative entities can steer clear of any serious constitutional

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at *10.
Id. (citing Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (M.D. N.C. 2003)).
Id. (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997)).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *11 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)).
Id. at *11 (citing Kilper v. City of Arnold, 2009 WL 2208404, at *17 (E.D. Mo. 2009)).
See id.
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infirmities by imposing sanctions expressly labeled as “civil” in nature,
eliminating the stricter requirements attached to criminal sanctions.
Specifically, by imposing civil, non-punitive sanctions for photocaptured violations, the state avoids the implications of criminal liability: 1) the Confrontation Clause is inoperative, notwithstanding, after
all, that the alleged violator cannot confront his “accuser” — the camera that captured his violation; 2) the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against self-incrimination is inoperative, insofar as incrimination necessarily involves underlying conduct that is criminal in nature; and 3)
the Due Process Clause requires a markedly lesser degree of “process” in the context of civil infractions.
Arguably, the implementation of automated traffic systems may
pass constitutional muster in terms of violations of individual rights,
yet the legal inquiry does not reach a dead-end merely because the
automated systems themselves are theoretically constitutional. The
issue turns on the complexities of administrative law and the intrastate relations of local governments, law enforcement and private
companies.
Although the majority of challenges to the use of automated traffic detectors have focused on individual rights, a few, rare challenges
have been raised against a state or local authority for entering into a
71
contract with a private third party. In two factually similar cases,
plaintiffs filed suit against ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., the
company providing “traffic signal enforcement systems to municipali-

71 See, e.g. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Nassau Cnty. Traffic & Parking Violations
Agency, 34 Misc.3d 844, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“If the insurance company wishes to obtain
information gathered through the Red Light Camera Program in anticipation of future litigation,
it may do so at their own expense directly through the vendor.”); People v. Daugherty, 199 Cal.
App. 4th Supp. 1, 4 (Cal. App. Div. Super. Ct. 2011) (finding the “cost-neutrality” provision of
contract between city and Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc. improperly incentivized issuance of citations
by compensating the company based on the number of citations generated); Wiles v. Ascom
Transp. Sys., Inc., No. 3:10–CV–28–H., 2011 WL 672652, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (rejecting argument
that company was a private actor acting as a state actor “under color of law”); Jadeja v. Redflex
Traffic Sys., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge based
on an alleged “legally protected interest in freedom from unfair or unlawful business practices
which led to the inclusion of the cost-neutral clause in the contract between Redflex and Menlo
Park”); Kennedy v. Polumbo, 704 S.E.2d 916, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (ruling in favor of city and
private company, asserting that “it is immune as a matter of law because it installed the red-light
camera with proper care and skill pursuant to its contract with the City”); Ward v. ACS State &
Local Solutions, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Texas App. 2010) (finding summary judgment was
appropriate because plaintiffs failed to establish company’s “failure to acquire a license would or
could have any exclusionary effect on the admissibility of the evidence concerning the red light
violation”); Verrando v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., No. 3:08–CV–2241–G., 2009 WL
2958370, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding plaintiffs failed to establish causal connection between
company’s failure to acquire license and plaintiffs’ alleged injury).
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ties,” asserting negligence per se based on the company’s failure to
72
acquire the proper occupational license required by state law.
Whereas most challenges are filed by an alleged violator who
outright denies liability, plaintiffs in Verrando and Ward did not contest their respective violations and the consequential fine imposed,
nor did they challenge the accuracy of the company’s automated systems that captured their cars in the intersection after the traffic signals
73
had turned to red. Rather, plaintiffs argued that the photographs
were impermissible evidence since the company did not have the
state-mandated occupational license for an entity that acts as an “in74
vestigations company.”
Essentially, in both Verrando and Ward, plaintiffs arguments were
“premised on the notion that, but for the operation of the ACS75
installed, red-light camera, no citation would have been issued.”
Ironically, and unsuccessfully, plaintiffs attempted to establish the
company’s liability by asserting the injury they suffered - the civil fine
76
imposed - occurred when they unlawfully ran a red light. The courts
rejected such claims by stating matter-of-factly: “[P]laintiffs do not
have a legally protected right to engage in illegal conduct and be free
77
from the consequences.”
Ultimately, plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to exclude evidence
acquired through the unlicensed company’s automated camera system
were fatal-by-design: in order to avoid the civil penalty imposed for
photo-captured infraction, plaintiffs emphatically focused on the
company’s failure to comply with the state’s occupational code, while
simultaneously disregarded their liability for the actual violation un78
derlying the entire claim.
Notwithstanding the obvious infirmity of challenging automated
camera systems without contesting the infraction issued therefrom,
plaintiffs have filed suit, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, against municipalities based on their contractual relationship with a private company to operate the entire red-light-camera program, including not

72

See Ward, 328 S.W.3d 648; Verrando, 2009 WL 2958370.
See sources cited supra note 72.
74 Ward, 328 S.W.3d at 651 (citing TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.101 (2004) (“Chapter 1702
requires that any person who acts as an ‘investigations company’ obtain an investigations company license.”)).
75 Ward, 328 S.W.3d at 652; see also Verrando, 2009 WL 2958370.
76 See sources cited supra note 75.
77 Verrando, 2009 WL 2958370,at *3 (citing Bell v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 4:08-CV444-MHS-DDB, at 5 (E.D. Tex. Mar., 25, 2009) (unpublished opinion)).
78 Id.
73
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only installation and maintenance, but also image review, issuance of
79
citations, and collections of fines imposed for violations.
Plaintiffs in Leonte alleged that the private company performed
all the tasks of the automated program without any involvement by
80
the city. However, the court rejected the argument based on the contract with the city that showed it “retains the right to ‘monitor, evaluate, and provide guidance to the CONTRACTOR in the performance
of’ the contract and ‘the right of access to all activities and facilities
operated by the CONTRACTOR under this Agreement’ and to ‘all
files, records, and other documents related to the performance of this
81
Agreement.’”
Although the Leonte court ultimately upheld the contract’s validity as it pertained to plaintiffs’ due process claim, the court did not
necessarily delve into the issue of whether the city’s “retaining the
right” actually had legal force or was merely a passive “right” that
could be invoked at the whim of a city official, yet otherwise a dormant right that was neither required nor necessarily invoked during
82
the duration of the contract.
III. FLORIDA’S TRAFFIC SAFETY ACT
The Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act enables “local departments,
municipalities, and agencies” to implement automated traffic83
enforcement technology, namely, red-light cameras. Interpreting the
Act broadly, a majority of local authorities have contracted with private, third-party contractors to install, maintain, and/or operate red79 See, e.g., Leonte v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th 521, 528 (2d Cal.
Ct. App. 2004).
80 Id.
81 See id. at 527 (“We believe that the statutory purpose of authorizing the use of automated traffic enforcement systems is best served by a construction of ‘operate’ that allows a
governmental agency to hire private contractors to perform a broad range of functions. We
therefore conclude that former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 did not prohibit a governmental
agency from hiring a private company to perform functions in connection with the operation of
an automated traffic enforcement system provided that the governmental agency retained the
right to oversee and control the functioning of the system and thereby ultimately was the system
operator. A governmental agency retains the right to oversee and control the functioning of the
system if it retains the right to ensure satisfactory performance through such means as the right
to inspect, the right to make suggestions as to the details of the contractor’s performance, and
the right to terminate the contract.”).
82 See id. at 526 (“The parties dispute the meaning of the italicized language and particularly the meaning of the word ‘operate,’ which former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 did not
define.” “Former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 (Stats. 2001, ch. 496, § 1) authorized the use of
automated traffic enforcement systems at intersections where drivers are required to stop. Subdivision (a) of the statute stated in part, ‘[o]nly a governmental agency, in cooperation with a law
enforcement agency, may operate an automated enforcement system.’”).
83 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010).
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84

light-camera programs. Although some local authorities have enacted ordinances to limit the discretion of these private entities, other
local authorities, including major metropolitan areas such as the City
of Miami, have entered into agreements that delegate substantial dis85
cretion to private entities located outside the State of Florida.
Although the legislature contemplated the presence of private
contractors in the initial implementation of the red-light programs
within the enactment of the Act, this mere presence cannot be said to
encompass the role of the private contractor as has been broadly construed by individual municipalities and counties.
A. Legislative Intent
The question is: did the Florida Legislature intend for “local departments, municipalities, and agencies” to also include a delegation of
similar authority to “manufacturers and vendors” referred to elsewhere in the Act?
86
The role of “vendors and manufacturers” within the definition of
the Act was intended to refer to the companies supplying and installing the equipment. Further, in some cases, the role of the vendor
and/or manufacturer may, in fact, exist beyond the initial installation,
but this continued relationship between the vendor or manufacturer,
and the municipality or county, was intended for purposes of “mainte87
nance” of the equipment hardware itself.
In analyzing the fiscal impact of the Act on local governments,
the legislature acknowledged the possibility for the municipality or
county to contract with a private vendor:
If local governments choose to enact ordinances to permit the
use of traffic infraction detectors, there will be a fiscal impact to
the local governments for the cost of the installation and maintenance of the devices. The impact will vary depending on the ne-

84 See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa R. Rhea, P.E., Dir. Pub. Works, to Bruce T. Haddock,
City Mgr., Oldsmar, Fla. (Nov. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.myoldsmar.com/
Pages/Agendas/OldsmarFL_CouncilAgendas/12062011/Item005.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum
from Lisa R. Rhea]; Memorandum from Alex Rey, Town Mgr., to Mayor & Town Council, Miami
Lakes, Fla. (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.miamilakes-fl.gov/pdfs/Agendas/2011/2011-0712-agenda-packet.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Alex Rey]; Memorandum from Louis
Moore, supra note 8; City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; Orange Cnty.,
Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
85 E.g., City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8.
86 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010).
87 See, e.g., H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Mar. 9, 2010, H.R. 325, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
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gotiated agreement between the local government and any pri88
vate vendor providing equipment.
This pre-enactment recognition of private vendors providing
equipment was eventually sanctified in the Uniform Traffic Control
Code’s provision for “transitional implementation” of automated in89
fraction detectors after enactment of the Act. The provision initially
sets forth the general mandate for post-enactment implementation of
the systems, insofar as “any traffic infraction detector deployed on the
highways, streets, and roads of [the] state must meet specification es90
tablished by the Department of Transportation. . . .”
However, recognizing the pre-enactment installation of such
automated detectors, the “transitional implementation” legislative
mandate includes two exemptions for any equipment, either: 1) “acquired by purchase, lease, or other arrangement under an agreement
entered into by a county or municipality on or before July 1, 2011”; or
2) “used to enforce an ordinance enacted by a county or municipality
91
on or before July 1, 2011.” Accordingly, if such exemptions apply, the
equipment is “not required to meet the specifications established by
92
the Department of Transportation until July 1, 2011.”
Based on the legislative history and subsequent legislation therefrom, the Act intended for manufacturers and/or vendors to provide
the automated detector equipment, as well as the possibility to ensure
its functionality after the initial installation, whereas the “operation”
and “implementation” of the system remained rightfully within the
authority of the local government yet limited by the Department of
Transportation’s discretion to prescribe and establish specifications
93
for uniform operation of such automated systems.
Aside from the actual traffic-infraction detectors, namely, the
equipment hardware itself, the continued role of the vendor and/or
manufacturer was not necessarily contemplated or intended when the
94
Act was presented before the legislature. Specifically, the bills pro-

88

Id. (emphasis added).
FLA. STAT. § 316.07456 (2010).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010) with H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 26, 2011, H.R.
149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010);
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr.. 19, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); and S. BILL ANALYSIS &
FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 14, 2010, S.B. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
94 See generally H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 26, 2011, H.R. 149, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011);
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 13, 2010, H.R. 325, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS,
Apr. 19, 2010, H.R. 325, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); S. BILL ANALYSIS & FISCAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, Apr. 14, 2010, S. 2166, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
89
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posed various provisions that referred explicitly to the governmental
95
entity, not a private vendor or contractor. Moreover, the ordinances
enacted based on the enabling legislation rarely, if ever, make any
96
mention of a private, third-party vendor, even though the municipalities engaging in pre-ordinance discussion, at the very least, contem97
plated the use of private companies.
1. Statutory Requirements For State Entities Awarding Contracts
Based on the legislative history, the legislature acknowledged the
existence of pilot programs used to ascertain data in order to select a
given intersection based on statistical proof. However, even in these
cases, the legislative history is silent as to the vendor and/or manufacturer of the equipment having any role in the collection of such data,
and certainly not in any subsequent contracts, for the continued role
of the private entity once the pilot programs ceased.
Nonetheless, based on the procedural safeguards set forth in statutes directly regulating the contract bid process, the legislature expressly rejected the role of private contractors in the selection process
wherein the participants have any interest in the selection of a given
98
bid proposal.
The Orange County Pilot Project did not install the cameras to issue tickets for the violations captured by the new systems, but merely
99
to evaluate the effectiveness of the system and its implementation.
“The study objectives were to validate the severity of red-light running in Orange County, test public reaction, and quantify needed re100
sources.” Taken individually and collectively, these objectives are
empty assertions for a study that, at best, could possibly provide
evaluative value as to the prevalence of red-light violations at any
given intersection. Arguably, the study itself was result-driven from its
nascence.
After submitting its contract proposal to the county, American
Traffic Solutions, Inc., a Scottsdale-based corporation, was awarded
the contract in order to “design, furnish, and assist with installation
and operation of video detection cameras at all approaches of the five

95

Id.
See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing municipality interpretation of the Act and the
subsequent ordinances enacted therefrom).
97 See discussion infra Part III.B (providing details of city commission meeting and the
resolution to approve a contract between the city and a private company).
98 FLA. STAT. § 334.193 (2010).
99 Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
100 Id.
96
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101

This familiar contract language, often reselected intersections.”
ferred to as the “scope” of a private corporation’s red-light systems,
appears in some form or another in almost any given contract between local government and the third-party contractors for the opera102
tion of red-light cameras.
The approach taken in Orange County was prior to the enactment of the Traffic Safety Act, which could explain the reason for a
“study” that did not issue tickets or even take photographs or video.
“No video recording or snapshot photos [were] taken and no citations
103
were issued.”
Interestingly, at the pre-Traffic Safety Act phase, ATS strategically sowed the seed for the future legislative authorization of the redlight programs. When the Florida Legislature finally enacted the Act,
“Orange County selected American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (ATS)
based in Scottsdale, Arizona to install the photo enforcement system
since this same vendor installed cameras for the red-light running detection study. Use of the same vendor provided a cost savings for the
104
County.”
Essentially, the company providing the data to determine
whether red-light programs should be enforced was the same company that would eventually operate the program whenever such systems became legal and, thus, profitable — provided that the company’s data indicated the programs should be enforced.
105
Undoubtedly, the county appropriately asserts “cost savings” as
its reason for granting ATS the contract to enforce the program; however, and more significantly, the county does not indicate any concern
with the authenticity and objectivity of the study and its results. Basically, as ATS lobbyists worked the legislators in Tallahassee, ATS contractors were fervently placing themselves in all the right places for
106
the “right time” to come — enactment of the Act.
In section 334.193 of the Florida Statutes (2010), dealing with
transportation administration, the legislative mandate expressly prohibits participation in the bidding process by certain persons with financial interests in the purchase, sale and/or selection of contract bid

101

Id.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa R. Rhea, supra note 84; Memorandum from Alex Rey,
supra note 84; Memorandum from Louis Moore, supra note 8; City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
103 Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 LOBBYING FIRM COMP. REP. BY PRINCIPAL, available at http://olcrpublic.leg.state.fl.us
(Fla. 2008).
102
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proposals between a governmental entity and private contractor.
The legislative prohibition states:

(1) It is unlawful . . . for any company, corporation or firm in
which . . . an employee . . . has a financial interest, to bid on, enter
into, or to be personally interested in: (a) [t]he purchase or furnishing of any materials or supplies to be used in the work of the
state; (b) [a] contract for . . . the performance of any other work
108
for which the department is responsible.
Based on this statutory provision, ATS is undisputedly a corporation/company/firm, notwithstanding its role in the operation of redlight-camera programs. In this capacity, ATS was hired to implement
the pilot program in Orange County, prior to any legislative enactment allowing issuance of citations for red-light violations.
Initially, ATS’ role in the pilot program was to collect statistical
data in order for the county to decide whether a red-light program
would be appropriate within the county at any given intersection.
Nonetheless, ATS purchased and/or furnished the equipment for the
pilot program and, subsequently, furnished the equipment in its operation of the red light camera programs once the legislature enacted its
109
usage in the issuance of citations.
Throughout its existence within Orange County, ATS was financially interested in the implementation and continued operation of a
red-light camera program. However, whereas its initial role in the
pilot program was purportedly “objective,” insofar as its role was to
ascertain statistical data, ATS’ subsequent role in contracting with the
county was based on the company’s assessment that a red light camera
program would be beneficial to the county.
Where the lines of objectivity and substantial fiscal interests are
intertwined as such, any private company could hardly be objective if
the outcome of its data is dependent on its future as a potential contractor with the county.
2. Statutory Requirements For Uniform Traffic Code
The Florida Legislature adopted Chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes, commonly known as the “Uniform Traffic Code” (“Code”), for
the legislative purpose of providing uniform application of traffic laws
throughout the State and its counties and of traffic ordinances in its

107
108
109

FLA. STAT. § 334.193 (2010)
Id.
Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
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110

municipalities. Notwithstanding whether the state entity is a municipality or county, the Code includes the following proviso applicable to all local governmental entities: “It is unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with
111
the provisions of this chapter.”
Contained within the Code, the legislature specifically enumerated the proper scope of a municipality’s authority to control traffic in
112
their respective jurisdictions. Among the legislative directive, section
316.008 of the Code provides explicit parameters for the local authori113
ties’ exercise of its police powers, acknowledging the interrelations
114
of other state entities and their respective ability to regulate traffic
while upholding the Code’s purpose of uniform application through115
out the entire state, regardless of jurisdiction.
Section 316.008(1) delegates qualified power to the local authorities, wherein the Code is intended to provide the minimum statutory
requirements necessary for uniform application of traffic laws, but not
intended to prevent local entities from regulating streets and highways
within their respective jurisdictions and with their reasonable exercise
116
of police power.
Among the enumerations contained in section 316.008(1) for the
power of local entities, the Code includes the following permissible
exercise of local authorities: “(b) Regulating traffic by means of police
officers or official traffic control devices. . . . (w) Regulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel on public
streets and highways, whether by public or private parties and providing for the construction and maintenance of such streets and high117
ways.”
In order to maintain the Code’s purpose of uniformity, section
316.008(8) addresses the specific guidelines for local entities operating
automated traffic infraction detectors pursuant to the Traffic Safety
110

FLA. STAT. § 316.002 (2011).
Id.
112 Id.
113 As defined in section 316.003, the term “[l]ocal authorities,” as it appears within Chapter
316, including the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, includes “all officers and
public officials of the several counties and municipalities of this state.” FLA. STAT. § 316.003(20)
(2010).
114 As defined in section 316.003, the term “official traffic control devices,” as it appears
within Chapter 316, including the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, is defined as:
“All signs, signals, markings, and devices, not inconsistent with this chapter, placed or erected by
authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction for the purpose of regulating, warning,
or guiding traffic.” FLA. STAT. § 316.003(23) (2010).
115 FLA. STAT. § 316.008 (2011).
116 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(1) (2011).
117 FLA. STAT. §§ 316.008(1)(b), (1)(w) (2011).
111
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118

Act. This section begins with the legislature’s initial recognition that
a county or municipality may implement the use of traffic infraction
119
detectors pursuant to section 316.0083 of the Florida Statutes. Immediately thereafter, the legislature included the following qualifica120
tions for the use of traffic-infraction detectors : “Only a municipality
may install or authorize the installation of such detectors” within the
incorporated areas of the municipality, and “only a county may install
or authorize the installation of such detectors” within the unincorpo121
rated areas of the county.
Undoubtedly, as the legislature acknowledged the possible role of
122
private parties to construct or maintain streets and highways, the
legislature also recognized the possible role of a third-party contractor
to provide equipment and installation of red-light cameras, which include technological software and specialized technical training that
123
would not otherwise be readily available to a local entity. This legislative recognition of the need for third-party equipment and installation is contained within section 316.008, which deals specifically and
exclusively with the exercise of local power pursuant to the Traffic
Safety Act; section 316.008(b) provides that a county or municipality
may “install or, by contract or interlocal agreement, authorize the in124
stallation of any such detectors” within its respective jurisdiction.
Notably, while the first sub-section of section 316.008 authorizes
the local entity’s “use of traffic infraction detectors,” the second subsection merely provides local authorities with the means to acquire
125
the detectors and ensure proper installation.
Based on the dual purposes of both the Traffic Safety Act and the
Traffic Safety Code, the legislature defers to the discretion of the Department of Transportation, an agency appointed with the task of up-

118

FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8) (2011).
FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8)(a) (2011).
120 In section 316.003, the term “[t]raffic infraction detector,” as it appears within Chapter
316, including the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, is defined as
119

[a] vehicle sensor installed to work in conjunction with a traffic control signal and a camera
or cameras synchronized to automatically record two or more sequenced photographic or
electronic images or streaming video of only the rear of a motor vehicle at the time the vehicle fails to stop behind the stop bar or clearly marked stop line when facing a traffic control signal steady red light.
FLA. STAT. § 316.003(87) (2011).
121 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8)(a) (2011).
122 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(1)(b) (2011).
123 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(1)(b), (8)(b) (2011).
124 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8)(a)-(c) (2011).
125 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.008(a), with FLA. STAT. § 316.008(b).

160

FIU Law Review

[8:137

holding the guidelines of the Code and ensuring statewide uniformity
126
in traffic regulation.
In conjunction with the legislature’s intention to confer to local
authorities the power to utilize traffic infraction detectors, the Traffic
Safety Act’s legislative history reflects the legislature’s concern with
the possibility that local authorities may invoke the Act and, consequently, frustrate the Code’s purpose of ensuring statewide uniform127
ity. Within a staff report providing substantive analysis of traffic control devices that are installed and operated by the state and local governments, the legislature acknowledged that “all public bodies or officials that purchase and install traffic control devices in Florida must
ensure that such devices conform to the manual and specifications of
128
the [Department of Transportation].”
Accordingly, the Code requires the municipality or county to
erect appropriate signage to inform drivers approaching an intersec129
tion equipped with a traffic infraction detector. The signage must be
in compliance with the requirements of Florida Department of Trans130
portation. Specifically, this requirement was imposed upon the municipality and/or county according to their role within the meaning of
the Act, wherein the local entity could elect to utilize traffic infraction
detectors but, in so doing, would also be required to take measures to
131
ensure the uniformity and consistency throughout the state.
Based on the legislative history, the Act cannot be construed as
having been intended to include the role of red light camera vendors
and/or manufacturers in erecting the appropriate signage.
Although, standing alone, the signage provisions of various
agreements between the private contractors and a given county or
municipality are not necessarily unlawful, these provisions should be
taken within the contexts of the entire contracts. In the aggregate,
these contracts ultimately open the door for the municipality to delegate all its responsibilities to one private contractor in one contract,
126 In section 316.003, the term “department,” as it appears within Chapter 316, including
the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, is defined as “[t]he Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles . . . Any reference [within this chapter] to Department of Transportation shall be construed as referring to the Department of Transportation . . . or the appropriate
division thereof.” FLA. STAT. § 316.003(8) (2011).
127 See, e.g.,H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 26, 2011, H.R. 149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
128 Id.
129 FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(a) (2010) (“If the department, county, or municipality installs a
traffic infraction detector at an intersection, the department, county, or municipality shall notify
the public that a traffic infraction device may be in use at that intersection . . . . Such signage
used to notify the public must meet the specifications for uniform signals and devices adopted by
the Department of Transportation . . . .”).
130 Id.
131 Id.
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ultimately allocating all governmental duties of a legislative scheme
that was intended to remain within the authority of the local government — not of a private company.
The procedures for issuance and processing of citations enumerated in the Act provide specific directives addressed to the municipali132
ties and/or counties. Section 318.0083(1)(a) of the Act allows the
department, a county, or a municipality to “authorize a traffic infraction enforcement officer . . . to issue a traffic citation” for one’s failure
133
to stop at a red light. This provision reflects the traditional enforcement of traffic infractions by an officer’s personal issuance of a cita134
tion.
Subsequently, the legislature included the following provision in
order to incorporate the newly-implemented automated infraction
detectors with the traditional traffic enforcement procedure: notwithstanding the authorization for a traffic enforcement officer to issue a
citation, local authorities may authorize “review of information from a
traffic infraction detector by an authorized employee or agent of the
department, a county, or a municipality before issuance of the traffic
135
citation by the traffic infraction enforcement officer.”
Prior to the Act’s final enactment, the bills presented to the legislature made a distinction between the traffic-infraction detector and
the traffic infraction enforcement officer, wherein the detector is a
machine that produces data that is read by a person, namely, the offi136
cer, who is authorized to review and/or issue notice violations. Together, the report of an officer and the data collected by the detectors
would be akin to the presence of the officer during the violation.
However, the legislature had no reason to believe this was a “tiered”
process like the one created by the agreements between the municipalities and the private contractors, although such process has recently
137
been judicially recognized in a few cases.
132

FLA. STAT. § 316.0083(1)(a) (2010).
Id.
134 See Letter from Charlie Crist, supra note 7.
135 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083(1)(a) (2010).
136 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010), with H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 26, 2011, H.R.
149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010);
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr.. 19, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); and S. BILL ANALYSIS &
FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 14, 2010, S.B. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
137 Id. See, e.g., Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2
(E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“Redflex employees review the images taken from the camera or images
demonstrating that a particular motor vehicle ran a red light. If the license tag number is visible,
then the Redflex employee provides an image of the violation which demonstrates the violation
and clearly shows the license number of the vehicle. Still photos taken from the video showing
the violation are sent to the Knoxville Police Department where an officer views the snapshot(s)
and sends the citation to the registered owner of the vehicle. Under the Program, the fine can be
133

162

B.

FIU Law Review

[8:137

Municipality Ordinances Based On Broad Interpretation of the
Act

The Traffic Safety Act was intended to enable local authorities to
utilize automated traffic infraction detectors as alternative mechanisms for enforcing red-light running violations and promoting traffic
138
safety. Subsequent to enactment of the enabling legislation, local
authorities statewide enacted ordinances in order to adopt the use of
139
red-light camera systems.
Prior to the Act’s enactment, the City of Pembroke Pines requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to whether the city
could utilize unmanned cameras to record, but not necessarily enforce,
140
red light violations. The Attorney General opined that, based on
sections 316.002 and 316.008 of the Florida Statutes, the City of Pembroke Pines had the authority to enact an ordinance allowing the use
of automated infraction detectors in order to monitor red-light violations and record the license plate number of the car violating the traf141
fic signal.
Based on the Attorney General’s opinion, even if the City had
the power to monitor traffic by utilizing traffic infraction detectors, a
court must still abide by judicial precedent in order to ascertain the
142
scope of authority delegated in an enabling act. Therefore, the Attorney General acknowledged the role of the court upon judicial review: “It is a rule of statutory construction that an express power duly
conferred may include the implied authority to use the means necessary to make the express power effective, although such implied authority may not warrant the exercise of a substantive power not con143
ferred.”
In order to uphold uniformity through the State Uniform Traffic
Code, the legislature attempted to define the scope of permissible actions in the context of local authorities utilizing automated traffic144
infraction detectors. Section 316.0776 of the Florida Statutes pro-

paid by mail to Redflex.”); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181, 189 (D.C. 2007) (“Where an image is
recorded by system cameras — and unless the image is indecipherable (e.g., no clear image of
the license plate) or patently unusable (e.g., in speeding photos, more than one vehicle in the
‘detection area’) — a ‘draft’ [ticket] is prepared by ACS personnel for review by an MPD [Metropolitan Police Department] officer.”).
138 See FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2012).
139 See infra note 148.
140 See Letter from Charlie Crist, supra note 7.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. (citing Molwin Inv. Co. v. Turner, 167 So. 33 (Fla. 1936)).
144 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0776 (2010).
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vides specific requirements if “the department, county, or municipal145
ity” exercises the authority conferred to it by the Act.
The language contained within this provision of the Uniform
Code further reflects the legislative intent to require accountability by
the local entity implementing the use of red-light cameras: “if the department, county, or municipality installs a traffic infraction detector
at an intersection, the department, county, or municipality shall notify
146
the public that a traffic device may be in use.” Furthermore, if the
local entity “begins a traffic infraction detector program in a county or
municipality that has never conducted such a program, the respective
department, county, or municipality shall also make a public announcement and conduct a public awareness campaign of the pro147
posed use of traffic infraction detectors.”
However, the purpose of uniformity in statewide traffic enforcement is substantially aggravated by the Act’s broadly-defined adoption of automated traffic infraction detectors. Based on the Act’s
vaguely permissive language, these “traffic safety” ordinances reflect
the broadly-construed scope of implementing automated traffic detec148
Furthertors and enforcing photo-captured violations thereafter.
more, the markedly varied degree and extent of the traffic safety ordinances reflects the inconsistency of the municipalities’ interpretation
149
of the Act.
The Act enables “local departments, municipalities, and agencies”
150
to implement automated traffic infraction detectors. Some of the
subsequent ordinances enacted by these “local departments, municipalities, and agencies” delegate the task of implementing the automated traffic systems to a specific entity or individual within its juris151
diction. However, other ordinances expressly adopt language similar
145

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(a) (2010).
Id.
147 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(b) (2010).
148 Compare MIAMI GARDENS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 24-21 (2011), with
HOMESTEAD, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-6 (2012); SUNRISE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 14-74 (2012); AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 48-26 (2012), and
COLLIER CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 78-54 (2012).
149 Id.
150 See supra note 145.
151 COLLIER CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 78-54 (2012) (“The County Manager is
authorized to implement the provisions and requirements of the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety
Act . . . within this jurisdiction in coordination with the Sheriff.”); TALLAHASSEE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 20-50(a) (2012) (“The city manager or his/her designee is authorized to implement a system utilizing traffic infraction detectors pursuant to F.S. § 316.0083.”) (emphasis
added); MIAMI-DADE CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-422(3) (2012) (“The Mayor or
designee is authorized to implement the provisions and requirements of the Act . . . .”) (emphasis
added); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5-12 (2012) (“The city manager, or his/her
designee, is authorized to implement a system utilizing traffic infraction detectors pursuant to the
146
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to the Act, reflecting a broad delegation to the entire local entity,
rather than the specific entity that will, in actuality, undertake the task
152
delegated.
Although a rarity by comparison to the statewide majority, a few
ordinances expressly acknowledge the possibility for contracts with
private companies as a source of utilizing the municipality’s authority
153
to use automated traffic detectors. The City of Margate’s ordinance
is arguably the most transparent and narrowly-tailored acknowledgment of third-party involvement: “The city manager is authorized to
implement the provisions and requirements of [the Act], including but
not limited to, proposing the use of outside vendors to city commissioners to assist the city with implementing the installation and logis154
tics of the use of traffic infraction detectors.” Albeit a much weaker
acknowledgement, Manatee County’s ordinance recognizes the use of
a third party authorized to collect the penalties imposed by the ordi155
nance.
Notwithstanding these anomalous examples, the majority of ordinances remain silent regarding the use of private, third-party companies to implement and operate automated traffic detectors. The majority of municipalities enacting these ordinances, however, currently
contract with a few private companies, usually located outside the
state of Florida, to install, monitor, and operate automated systems.
Nonetheless, even when the resolutions for such contracts were
submitted for approval, city authorities often eluded any explicit discussion over the contractual relationship created between the city and
156
the private company. Strikingly, even in the instance of public dis-

provisions and requirements of F.S. § 316.0083 . . . .”) (emphasis added); ESCAMBIA CNTY., FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-183(b) (2012) (“Escambia County, through the county administrator, or his or her designee, is authorized to install and utilize traffic infraction detectors . . . ”)
(emphasis added).
152 AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 48-41 (2012); SUNRISE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 14-74 (2012) (“The city may utilize traffic infraction detectors as an ancillary
deterrent to traffic control signal violations . . . .”); HOMESTEAD, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §
18-21 (2012) (“When the city installs a traffic infraction detector at an intersection, it shall erect
signage at the intersection . . . .”); WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 86-200
(2012) (“The city exercises its option under F.S. § 316.008, to use traffic infraction detectors
within its jurisdiction . . . .”).
153 See discussion infra Part III.B.
154 MARGATE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-73.1 (2011).
155 MANATEE CNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-22-74 (2011) (“[T]he county administrator may either through staff or third party vendors employ such collection efforts . . . .”) (emphasis added).
156 See, e.g., Reg. Meeting Minutes R-10-0387 at 69-70 Dep’t Of Capital Improvements
Program, City of Miami City Comm’n (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://egov.ci.miami.fl.us/
meetings/2010/9/2093_M_City_Commission_10-09-16_Verbatim_Minutes_(Long).pdf. (“The critical
step in the process is that once a potential violation is identified, the information is electronically

2012]

Police Powers for Sale

165

sent over such contracts, local authorities dodged the issue of contracting away its authority to a private company, dismissing the public concern without even acknowledging the potentially damaging implica157
tions.
C.

Contracts Between Municipalities and Companies Providing
Red-Light Cameras

Based on local entities’ broad interpretation of the Traffic Safety
Act and subsequently-enacted ordinances, the majority of legislation
pertaining to the automated traffic-infraction detectors remains silent
on the employment of a private, third-party company located outside
the state. However, most municipalities expressly confer to private
companies the authority to implement and utilize the automated systems—the authority that the legislature expressly conferred to the
local entities themselves.
In February 2011, the City of Deland entered an agreement with
Sensys America, Inc., an agreement that strayed from the predominance of ATS in the statewide trend towards privatization of red-light158
Nevertheless, similar to the majority of agreecamera programs.
ments between private contractors and the local governmental en-

forwarded to the City where a traffic infraction enforcement officer views the footage and gives
that final authorization for – of a violation to be issued.”).
157 In a city commission meeting on September 16, 2010, a resolution was proposed to approve an agreement between the City of Miami and American Traffic Solutions, wherein the
company would “furnish, install, operate and maintain a traffic infraction detector program.” See
id. When the city commission opened the floor for public discussion, a Miami resident expressed
his concern, albeit somewhat inarticulately, about the contract resolution: “But listen, going to be
a problem because ATS is a private entity. It’s not a government function. It’s not government.”
Subsequently, the speaker began a somewhat rambling discussion, citing the common law, the
Constitution, and the American Civil Liberties Union. At some point, a commissioner interrupted the man’s oration and dismissively responded, “Thank you.” An exchange of unintelligible words ensued between the two individuals, wherein the commissioner demanded that the
man “quote . . . the amendment for equal protection,” and the man relentlessly emphasized,
“ATS is not a government agency.” Ultimately, since the man could not explicitly cite legal doctrine, the commissioner dismissed the man altogether, without any discussion of his underlying,
and arguably meritorious, argument against the role of ATS in the operation of the traffic infraction program. Id.
158 Initially, the City of Deland selected LaserCraft, Inc. for the implementation of the Red
Light Program, but before any installations, a class action suit was filed in the State of Florida
challenging the legality of the program. When the litigation was settled and the Act was finally
enacted throughout Florida, LaserCraft was purchased by ATS. However, since ATS was not the
vendor initially selected for the contract, the city once again issued a request for bid proposal.
This time around, the city selected Sensys America, Inc. See Request for Comm’n Action from
William Ridgway, Finance Dep’t Head, to City Mgr., City of Deland, Fla., (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file
with author).
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159

tity, the agreement included a provision in which Sensys was required to perform an “initial review” in preparing and processing the
160
citation recorded by the traffic infraction detector.
The provision, entitled “Citation Preparation and Processing Services,” defined the company’s role subsequent to the detection of a
traffic infraction by the company’s equipment: “Sensys shall perform
initial review of all data generated at the roadside, process and format
violations utilizing a computerized traffic citation program . . . and
transfer the citations to the Police Department’s computer for review
161
and decision on whether or not to issue a citation.”
This additional tier in the processing of a citation once a traffic
infraction detector has already recorded the data is precisely where
the legal issue lies. The legislature may have contemplated the implementation of red-light-camera programs, which would entail utilizing a traffic infraction detector supplied by a private company. However, beyond the actual hardware of the equipment, the legislature
never addressed or even acknowledged the role of a private company
in initially reviewing the data prior to the statutory review by a traffic
162
infraction enforcement officer.
Nonetheless, even if the initial review could be performed by a
person other than a duly sworn officer, such as a “specifically-trained
163
technician,” the legislative history addressed this initial review without any indication that this tier could be performed by any person
outside the state of Florida: “Traffic infraction enforcement officers . . .
must be physically located in the county or adjacent county in which
infractions he or she enforces occur, or in the jurisdiction of the circuit
164
court where the violation occurred . . . .”
Although such a restrictive mandate ultimately died on the Senate floor prior to enactment of the Act, this provision indicates the
159 “Infraction Processing . . . The Vendor shall make the initial determination that the
image meets the requirements of the Ordinance and this Agreement, and is otherwise sufficient
to enable the City to meets [sic] its burden of demonstrating a violation of the Ordinance. If the
Vendor determines that the standards are not met, the image shall not be processed any further.”
Agreement Between the City of Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions for Traffic Safety Camera
Program (February 8, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Agreement Between the City of
Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions].
160 See Request for Comm’n Action from William Ridgway, Finance Dep’t Head, to City
Mgr., City of Deland, Fla. (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010), with H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 26, 2011, H.R.
149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010);
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, March 9, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010), and S. BILL ANALYSIS
&FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, April 21, 2010, S. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
163 See, e.g., H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
164 S. BILL ANALYSIS & FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 21, 2010, S.B. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2010).
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locality was intended for the processing and issuance of citations for
165
violations recorded by the traffic infraction detectors. Furthermore,
based on this provision within the context of its legislative history, the
legislature may have intended to hone in on the locality, but neither
acknowledged nor addressed the notion of an initial review by anyone
other than an officer or technician within the state.
In theory, the legislature opted not to restrict the municipality by
requiring a duly sworn officer within the jurisdiction where the infraction took place, yet did not necessarily intend for this silence to be
construed broadly as to allow a third-party, private contractor, located
outside the state, to act as a “filter” for the initial review of data recorded using traffic infraction detectors.
IV. DOCTRINAL LIMITATIONS FOR CONTRACTS BETWEEN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ENTITIES
In light of the legislative history leading up to the enactment of
the Traffic Safety Act and the subsequent ordinances enacted locally
therefrom, the question is whether the current policies of state and
local authorities, and their ongoing contractual relationships with the
private companies providing “traffic infraction systems or programs,”
including not only the equipment but also the operation, maintenance,
review, and issuance of citations, comports with the laws limiting scope
of municipality power in order to safeguard against unfair business
practice and covert collusion.
A. Ultra Vires Doctrine
As a means of providing accountability for municipalities’ exercise of authority, courts have invoked the ultra vires doctrine, the
“long established principle that a municipality cannot contract away
166
the exercise of its police powers.” Based on this doctrine, a municipality may not enter into a contract that ultimately transfers to a pri167
vate entity or individual the municipality’s executive authority.
In Morgran Co., Inc. v. Orange Cnty., Morgran entered into an
agreement with Orange County, executed by a county chairman, “on
168
behalf of the Board of County Commissioners.”
Based on this
agreement, the county was obligated to “support and expeditiously

165

Id.
Morgran Co., Inc. v. Orange Cnty., 818 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citing Harnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); Chung v. Sarasota Cnty., 686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA
1996)).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 643.
166
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process” Morgran’s re-zoning application in exchange for a 50-acre
donation to the county for use as a park once the County fulfilled its
169
promise to “expeditiously support” Morgran’s application.
After Morgran submitted the re-zoning application, the county
rejected the re-zoning requests set forth therein and ultimately denied
170
Morgran’s application. Soon thereafter, Morgran filed suit against
the county for a breach of its agreement to support his application in
171
exchange for his donation of land for use as county property.
Morgran’s argument attempted to distinguish between “an obligation to support the request for rezoning and an obligation to ap172
prove the request.” In an attempt to defend the contract between
the county and the private contractor, Morgran argued that both contracting parties, well aware of the laws governing contract zoning, constructed “carefully worded, highly negotiated contract language that
‘[did] not purport, either impliedly or expressly, to restrict or any way
interfere with, the exercise of the Board of Commissioner’s police
173
power as the final zoning authority in the County.’”
The court rejected Morgran’s argument, statinding: “[t]his argument, we fear, draws too fine a distinction. . . . In Chung, in rejecting a
similar argument, the court noted that any hearings regarding the issue of rezoning would ‘be a pro forma exercise since the County has
174
already obligated itself to a decision.’” Accordingly, the court found
that the agreement between Morgran and the County was “unambiguously void as a matter of law, since . . . [it] requires the County to
175
contract away its police powers.”
In P.C.B. P’ship v. City of Largo, the city entered into an agreement that purportedly restricted the city’s authority in deciding
whether to a build a road, install a traffic device, and/or permit the
176
construction of a parking lot and storm drainage. In order to decide
whether the agreement between the city and the private entity was a
valid contract, the court found that “[t]he City [did] . . . not have the
authority to enter into such a contract, which effectively contract[ed]
177
away the exercise of its police powers.”
169

Id. at 641.
Id. at 642.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 643.
173 Id.
174 Id. (citing Chung v. Sarasota Cnty., 686 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).
175 Id. at 642.
176 P.C.B. P’ship v. City of Largo, 549 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
177 Id. at 741 (citing Harnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); City of Belleview v. Belleview
Fire Fighters, Inc., 367 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); City of Safety Harbor v. City of Clearwater, 330 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)).
170
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In so finding, the court invoked the ultra vires doctrine, which essentially invalidates a contract where a municipality does not have the
178
power to delegate its authority to a third-party, private contractor.
Basically, the rationale underlying the ultra vires doctrine is that if an
ordinance delegates to municipal officials an arbitrary discretion,
without providing definitive rules to guide the exercise of this dele179
gated authority, the ordinance cannot be enforced.
In County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, the court similarly invoked the ultra vires doctrine in order to invalidate an agreement between the city and a private agency, where the city’s ordinance did not
contain “objective guidelines and standards for its enforcement . . . nor
[could] such be reasonably inferred from the language of the ordi180
nance.” The court ruled that “an agreement effectively contracting
181
away a city’s exercise of its police power is unenforceable.”
The invalidating proposition underlying the ultra vires doctrine is
foundationally based on the general principle that “[u]nrestricted discretion in the application of a law without appropriate guidelines and
determining its meaning may not be delegated by the City Council to
182
an agency or to one person.”
B.

Contracts Based on Ordinances

Although a contract itself may be invalidated based on its unlawful delegation of unbridled discretion to a third-party entity, a substantially more complex legal issue arises where the contract is based on a
municipal ordinance. Accordingly, where a municipality enters into an
agreement based on a municipal ordinance, the issue becomes
whether the ordinance itself also violates the legislative delegation of
authority conferred through an enabling statute.
Generally, courts exercise a substantial degree of legislative deference, wherein an ordinance is presumptively within the authority
183
and discretion of its enacting municipality. The general principle is
that a municipal ordinance is inferior to the statute and, thus, cannot
178 Id. at 741 (citing Harnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (“While we have not found a
reported case in Florida regarding an ultra vires contract similar to the one in this case, a North
Carolina case is directly on point. . . .[T]he contract, which purported to restrict the discretion of
the governing body of the municipality to determine whether the street should be opened for the
public benefit, was ultra vires and of no legal effect.”)).
179 Amara v. Town of Daytona Beach Shores, 181 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (citing
Permenter v. Younan, 31 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1947)).
180 925 So. 2d 340, 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
181 Id. at 345 (citing P.C.B. P’ship, 549 So. 2d at 741-42).
182 City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. 1972) (citing
Stewart v. Stone, 130 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1961)); Amara, 181 So. 2d at 722.
183 City of Kissimmee v. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 915 So. 2d 205, 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
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However,
conflict with any controlling provision of that statute.
upon judicial review, a court should “indulge every reasonable pre185
sumption in favor of an ordinance’s constitutionality.”
Therefore, in order for an ordinance to be legislatively preempted, the state law and the local ordinance must “contradict each
186
other in the sense that both . . . cannot co-exist.” In order to ascertain the validity of the ordinance, the question before the court is:
“does compliance with the ordinance violate the state law, or make
compliance with state law impossible? It is not a conflict if the ordi187
nance is more stringent than the statute.”
However, where the issue before the court is based on an ordinance in furtherance of the municipality’s police power to promote
traffic safety, the legislature explicitly defined the interrelationship
between the requirements of the Uniform Traffic Code and the exercise of police power by local authorities: the Code’s purpose of promoting statewide uniformity in traffic regulation cannot prevent local
authorities from “[r]egulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or
parking. . . . Restricting the use of streets . . . [or] [r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel . . . whether
by public or private parties,” applying to all streets and highways under the municipality’s jurisdiction and “within the reasonable exercise
188
of the police power.”
Nonetheless, courts have recognized that modernized government includes the increased use of technological advancement and,
accordingly, the need for flexible, loosely drawn standards in regulat189
ing legislative enactments under the state’s police power. This recognition of the need for flexible rules so as not to restrict adapting to
changing circumstances has been a longstanding proposition, especially in the context of traffic safety: “public streets have never been
used by any vehicles that are as dangerous to the public as the automobile, and the power inherent in every municipality to protect life
and insure public safety will support all reasonable ordinances, rules
190
and regulations adopted by the proper authority for such purpose.”
In recognizing the need for legislation to adapt to technological
advancements and modernizations of governmental functions, a court
will nevertheless remain steadfast in the notion that, when a statute’s

184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 894 So. 2d 1011, 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Kissimmee, 915 So. 2d at 209.
F.Y.I. Adventures, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 698 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
Id.
FLA. STAT. §§ 316.008(1), (1)(a), (1)(g), (1)(w) (2008).
City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. 1972).
Taylor v. Roberts, 94 So. 874, 876 (Fla. 1922).
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delegation of power does not also provide adequate safeguards
against “unfairness or favoritism,” and when an available safeguard
191
could have easily been provided, the legislation cannot be upheld.
The Florida Supreme Court explained, “[i]n other words, the legislative exercise of the police power should be so clearly defined, so limited in scope, that nothing is left to the unbridled discretion or whim
of the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of enforc192
ing the act.”
Nonetheless, even if the ordinance could be classified as an exercise of local authority to promote health, welfare, safety and/or morality, “it is still necessary that the exactions be fixed in the ordinance
with such certainty that the granting and denial . . . could not be left to
193
the whim of a private [entity] . . . or the administrative agency.” The
general proposition underlying the requirement that ordinances be
clearly and narrowly drawn is that a municipality cannot delegate its
function to legislate – that is, to exercise discretion as to the content of
the law. Local authorities may make a law and incorporate therein a
condition precedent upon which execution may depend, but it cannot
194
be made to depend on the unbridled discretion of a single individual.
In order to prescribe the permissible scope of an ordinance,
courts have compared three interrelated factors: 1) the enacting legislation; 2) the authority conferred to the local entity; and 3) the effect
195
of the local entity’s exercise of this authority through an ordinance.
Based on this three-prong comparison, a valid ordinance “must
prescribe definite rules and conditions which . . . shall [be met] and
may not leave the determination . . . to the undirected and uncon196
Conversely,
trolled discretion of even the . . . [local] authority.”
where an ordinance does not set forth any criteria for making determinations other than simply identifying a general prerequisite, the
burden of determining who falls within the ordinance “involve[s] legal
questions too intricate to impose as a condition precedent” on a third197
party entity.

191

Fleetwood Hotel, 261 So. 2d at 806 (quoting Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla.

1969)).
192

Id.
Amara v. Town of Daytona Beach Shores, 181 So. 2d 722, 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
194 Id. (citing State ex. rel. Taylor v. City of Tallahassee, 177 So. 719, 721 (1937)).
195 Id.
196 Amara, 181 So. 2d at 724 (citing State ex. rel. Ware v. City of Miami, 107 So. 2d 387 (Fla.
3d DCA 1958)).
197 Id.
193
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Problematic Operation Of Contracts Between Municipalities
And Private Companies
In a practical and most basic sense, the vast majority of contracts
between municipalities and private companies for the installing, furnishing, maintaining, and operating of automated traffic infraction
detectors necessarily involves the following sequence of events, com198
monly referred to as the “traffic-infraction-detector program”:
1) Scott’s car travels through an intersection after the light has
turned red;
2) If his car exceeds a specific speed at a specific time after the
light turned red, Scott’s car will trigger two sensors, one at the moment
his car crosses the line into the intersection, and one at some point
199
further in the intersection;
3) These sensors will instantaneously emit a signal to cameras
perched up on poles and situated in such a way that a picture and/or
video can capture the entire intersection and, at the same time, capture Scott’s car passing through the intersection and his license plate
200
number;
4) These images are then transmitted online to company technicians, usually located outside the state, who initially review the images
201
of Scott’s car;
5) Upon review, if the technician concludes that Scott’s car did
pass through the intersection after the traffic signal turned red, the
technician will access an online database provided by Florida’s Department of Motor Vehicles, enter in the license plate number, and
record Scott’s information, including his mailing address, for subse202
quent issuance of the citation;
6) Once the technician has input Scott’s information into an electronic citation template prepared by the company, the citation, includ-

198 See, e.g., City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; City of Ocoee, Am.
Traffic Solutions Contractsupra note 40; City of Ft. Lauderdale, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract,
supra note 40.
199 See generally U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 4.
200 Id.
201 See generally, Memorandum from Lisa R. Rhea, supra note 84; Memorandum from Alex
Rey, supra note 84; Memorandum from Louis Moore, supra note 8; Memorandum from Leonard
G. Rubin, supra note 84; City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; Orange
Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
202 See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions, supra note
159.
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ing images of Scott’s car, will then be transmitted to the State for ap203
proval by a law enforcement officer;
7) Upon approval, the law enforcement officer’s electronic signa204
ture will be superimposed on the electronic citation template;
8) The company or the officer will print and mail the citation; and
finally,
9) Within a few days, Scott will be issued his “notice of a violation.”
In terms of logistics for the automated system’s process, the company provides the following services based on its contract with a municipality: furnishing the equipment; installing the device — which, in
some cases, includes the company receiving an easement for placing
camera posts on private property — at or near the intersection; conducting training programs for law enforcement and city employees
using the company’s software, and for judicial officers specially
trained for appeal purposes to testify in favor of the company’s system; maintaining the camera by providing periodic audits; providing
and ensuring the security of the electronic database software transmitting information from the camera to the company and law enforcement; monitoring and initially reviewing images to identify an actual
violation; accessing the Department of Motor Vehicle database to
identify owners’ information; transmitting and providing the citation
template for law enforcement review; and ultimately, issuing citations
205
and/or collecting fines therefrom.
By contrast, the municipality’s contractual obligations with the
company require the municipality to take the following actions: provide the company access to traffic signals, including access to the devices’ timing and synchronization; designate specific city employees to
aid the company’s performance of the automated systems, including
the company’s mandatory training programs for law enforcement and
judicial officers; facilitate the process for acquiring an easement of
203 See, e.g., Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2
(E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“Redflex employees review the images taken from the camera or images
demonstrating that a particular motor vehicle ran a red light. If the license tag number is visible,
then the Redflex employee provides an image of the violation which demonstrates the violation
and clearly shows the license number of the vehicle. Still photos taken from the video showing
the violation are sent to the Knoxville Police Department where an officer views the snapshot(s)
and sends the citation to the registered owner of the vehicle. Under the Program, the fine can be
paid by mail to Redflex.”); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181, 189 (D.C. 2007) (“Where an image is
recorded by system cameras—and unless the image is indecipherable (e.g. no clear image of the
license plate) or patently unusable (e.g. in speeding photos, more than one vehicle in the ‘detection area’)—a ‘draft’ [ticket] is prepared by ACS personnel for review by an MPD [Metropolitan
Police Department] officer.”).
204 See sources cited supra note 203.
205 See sources cited supra note 203.
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private property for the company’s use; enable the company’s access
to protected driver information; conduct periodic audits of the company’s system — so long as the company is given prior notice of the
audit; and any other collateral resources necessary for the company’s
206
operation of the system.
In most instances, the contracts between local authorities and private companies providing such services expressly delegate almost entirely the scope of the municipalities’ police powers. Interestingly,
most of these contracts include the transfer of obligations to the private companies through provisions containing language mirroring,
almost identically, to the statutory language relating to the municipali207
ties’ exercise of permissible police power.
Arguably, such agreements between a municipality and a private
company essentially contract away the municipality’s police powers in
the context of traffic regulation and enforcement. Not only does the
company obtain access to public resources that would normally be
provided to the municipality and its exercise of traffic enforcement,
but the company also obtains the authority to train city employees to
adapt to the company’s procedures for enforcement.
Nevertheless, the most significant indication of the municipality
contracting away its police powers is the company’s procedure for
initially reviewing images captured by its system prior to review by
law enforcement and the subsequent transmission of only those images that the company employee deemed as proof of the violation.
Not only is the company employee usually working outside the state
and not a sworn law enforcement officer, but he is also exercising his
own personal discretion in whether the images captured should be
transmitted to law enforcement for approval. Accordingly, the initial
review conducted by company employees is the sole determining factor in whether a citation will be issued, for even if law enforcement
retains the right to review the images, such review is subsequent to the
company employee’s initial determination that a violation occurred.
Ultimately, the determination of whether a violation has occurred
and a subsequent citation should be issued is left to the discretion of a
private, non-state actor, who, in most cases, has never even set foot —
or tire — on the state roads he monitors, and has never been trained
on the law he enforces.

206

See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions, supra note

159.
207 See, e.g., Memorandum from Louis Moore, supra note 8; City of Miami, Am. Traffic
Solutions Contract, supra note 8; Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.
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Potential Challenges To Ordinances Utilizing Automated Traffic
Systems

Because the majority of such ordinances are silent as to the role
of a private company in terms of the post-enactment ordinances, the
potential challenges of these ordinances seem highly unlikely to carry
the day. However, in at least three instances, the municipalities’ ordi208
nances may raise some questions of legality.
1. City Employee’s Sole Discretion To Appoint “Designee”
The most prevalent form of potentially invalid ordinances arises
when the municipality names a specific city employee to implement
the systems but also includes an alternative “designee,” wherein the
named employee has the discretion to delegate his own authority to
209
“his or her designee.” This problematic language does not generally
contain any degree of specificity or guidelines as to whom the named
210
employee may appoint as “his or her designee.”
Arguably, because the ordinances do not provide any specific criteria or minimum requirements for an appointed designee, the municipality intended this language to permit for the use of a private,
211
third-party company to act as the “designee.” The issue here is not
only the broad discretion conferred to an individual city employee to
delegate away his own authority to implement the entire automated
systems, but also the lack of specificity in terms of permissible designees based on explicit criteria to provide guidance and to limit the city
212
employee’s discretion to appoint a designee. Essentially, as these
ordinances stand now, a city employee may choose from a limitless
pool of potential designees, regardless of whether these designees are
state actors or private agents exercising the municipality’s power to
implement, operate, and maintain automated traffic systems.

208

See discussion supra. Part V.B(1)-(3).
See, e.g., TALLAHASSEE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-50(a) (2012) (“The city manager or his/her designee is authorized to implement a system utilizing traffic infraction detectors
pursuant to F.S. § 316.0083.”) (emphasis added); MIAMI-DADE CNTY., FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 30-422(3) (2012) (“The Mayor or designee is authorized to implement the provisions and requirements of the Act . . . .”) (emphasis added); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 26-33 (2012) (“The city manager, or his/her designee, is authorized to implement
a system utilizing traffic infraction detectors pursuant to provisions and requirements of F.S. §
316.0083 . . . .”) (emphasis added); ESCAMBIA CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94183(b)(2012) (“Escambia County, through the county administrator, or his or her designee, is
authorized to install and utilize traffic infraction detectors . . . .”) (emphasis added).
210 See sources cited supra note 209.
211 See sources cited supra note 209.
212 See sources cited supra note 209.
209
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2. Express Deviations From Standard Practices of Uniform Traffic
Code
The second instance of potentially problematic ordinances arises
in the rare instances in which the municipality expressly deviates from
the standard operations of the Uniform Traffic Code. The City of
Dunnellon enacted an ordinance allowing the city to “utilize image
capture technologies as a supplemental means of monitoring compli213
ance with laws related to traffic control signals . . . .” Although the
initial provisions do not reflect any deviation from the common practice of municipalities implementing automated systems, a subsequent
provision of the ordinance requires notices of photo-captured violations be “addressed using the city’s own special magistrates and not
214
through the uniform traffic citations or county courts.”
Nonetheless, in a collateral ordinance pertaining to the appropriate signage providing notice of the use of automated traffic systems,
the city expressly excuses violations of the Uniform Traffic Code’s
signage requirement, insofar as the ordinance includes the following
provision: “Failure to erect, maintain or create these signs shall not
invalidate or impair any enforcement of [the automated traffic detec215
tors].”
Strikingly, the ordinance does not address the specific purpose for
an alternative method of issuing citations based on its explicit dis216
missal of the state’s uniform traffic citations. Such explicit deviations
from the common operations of traffic regulation are particularly
troublesome because the Code’s purpose is to promote statewide uniformity of traffic enforcement and procedures therefrom. The Dunnellon ordinance is particularly anomalous based on its express deviation from the common operation of the Uniform Traffic Code, including the Code’s provisions on the issuance of uniform traffic citations
217
and the required signage.
Even more questionable, the ordinance deviates substantially
from the traditional practices of judicial proceedings relating to
photo-captured violations. Insofar as the operation of the city’s own

213

DUNNELLON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 65-2 (2010) (emphasis added).
Id.
215 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(a) (2010) (“If the department, county, or municipality
installs a traffic infraction detector at an intersection, the department, county, or municipality
shall notify the public that a traffic infraction device may be in use at that intersection . . . . Such
signage used to notify the public must meet the specifications for uniform signals and devices
adopted by the Department of Transportation pursuant to s. 316.0745.”), with DUNNELLON, FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 65-17 (2010).
216 See, e.g., DUNNELLON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 65-17.
217 Id.
214

2012]

Police Powers for Sale

177

“special magistrates,” a collateral provision of the city’s automated
traffic program explicitly renders the “formal rules of evidence” inap218
plicable. Alternatively, the ordinance provides a specific standard
for special magistrate’s discretion in allowing or disallowing specific
evidence, wherein “all evidence of a type commonly relied upon by
reasonable prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs shall be
admissible” and “any part of the evidence may be received in written
219
form.”
Such a flagrant dismissal of the traditional rules of evidence presents the issue of whether alleged violators captured by automated
detectors within Dunnellon’s jurisdiction are provided adequate process based on the requirements of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
In the context of due process, a deviation from formal rules of
evidence necessarily entails a deviation from the purposes and goals
of such rules, including the appropriate procedure required to protect
the individual’s right to due process.
In terms of equal protection, because the photo-captured violations issued by Dunnellon’s automated system do not require the procedural safeguards of formal rules of evidence, the alleged violators
may be similarly situated as alleged violators in other jurisdictions, yet
Dunnellon violators may not be similarly treated, at least in terms of
the admissibility of evidence to challenge a photo-captured violation.
3. Ordinances Creating Penalties Beyond Imposition of Monetary
Fines
The third instance of potentially problematic ordinances arises
where the local authority sets forth specific penalties for an alleged
violator who fails to respond to the issuance of a citation by ignoring
the citation altogether and failing to pay the fine imposed for the vio220
lation. The traditional imposition of civil penalties has been upheld
in the context of automated traffic systems based on the trend of judi221
cial restraint and legislative deference. Essentially, the imposition of
civil, as opposed to criminal, penalties for photo-captured violations
does not require any degree of heightened judicial review within the
222
context of citation proceedings.
218

Id.
DUNNELLON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 65-11(f).
220 See, e.g., SARASOTA CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 122-205(c) (2010).
221 See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining the distinction between civil and criminal
penalties, specifically in the context of the required process due for the imposition of such penalties).
222 See discussion supra Part II.C.
219
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Although the majority of municipalities utilizing automated systems impose a civil penalty and subsequent collections process for
failure to pay the citation, the penalty scheme set forth in Sarasota
County’s ordinance relating to photo-captured infractions imposes a
strikingly stringent form of liability: “suspension of county privileges,”
wherein an alleged violator’s failure to pay the civil fine will necessarily lead to the suspension, refusal, and denial of “any rights and privileges that such person may otherwise be entitled to enjoy, receive, or
223
benefit from the County . . . .” Specifically, the potentially revocable
rights and privileges of the county include “the right to obtain and
maintain an occupational license, the right to utilize County facilities,
the right to obtain any licenses or permits contemplated in the
224
Code.”
The county’s imposition of a particularly stringent penalty
scheme raises substantially more complex issues than the “mere civil
225
fine” commonly imposed for photo-captured violations.
Whereas
the process due in the context of civil fines is less demanding since the
penalty is limited to monetary loss, the county’s imposition of its own
specific penalties far exceeds the scope of monetary fines — the failure to pay such fines necessarily requires an outright denial of an individual’s rights to lawfully pursue his occupation by obtaining an occupational license, to enjoy public facilities, to conduct business, and to
226
travel lawfully by obtaining required licenses and permits.
The penalty scheme set forth in the county ordinance is potentially troublesome in light of the heightened penalties and the re227
quirements of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In the
context of due process, the possibility for an outright denial of an individual’s rights and privileges of the county would necessarily require a
heightened standard for citation proceedings because the loss of these
228
rights exceeds beyond the scope of a civil fine. Furthermore, in the
context of equal protection, alleged violators adjudicated under the
county’s jurisdiction may be similarly situated to those violators in
other jurisdictions, yet the substantial restrictions imposed on individuals within the county far exceeds the imposition of civil penalties
229
under jurisdictions outside the county.

223
224
225
226
227
228
229

SARASOTA CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 122-205(c) (2010).
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
SARASOTA CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 122-205(c)
See discussion supra Part II.C
SARASOTA CNTY. CODE OF ORDINANCES. § 122-205(c).
See discussion supra Part II.C.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Aside from the three particularly anomalous instances of potentially challengeable ordinances, the statewide implementation of
automated traffic detectors pursuant to the Mark Wandall Traffic
Safety Act does not, in and of itself, necessarily violate an individual’s
constitutional rights. Specifically, so long as the state-implemented use
of red-light cameras imposes only a civil penalty for violations captured therefrom, the degree of process due is substantially less strict
than the imposition of a punitive, criminal penalty. Based on this
characterization, the photo-captured infractions are akin to, albeit
more expansive than, a citation issued for an expired parking meter.
The implementation of red-light camera equipment itself is not a
particularly strong point of contention because local authorities undoubtedly have the authority to regulate traffic regulation and enforcement within their jurisdictions based on their police powers
therein. Moreover, the monitoring of such images does not necessarily
implicate any infringement on an individual’s diminished expectation
of privacy in the context of public roadways. Accordingly, the use of
such systems to capture violations and issue citations therefrom generally avoids any challenges based on an individual’s constitutional
rights protecting against self-incrimination and providing the opportunity to confront one’s accusers — so long as the penalties for photocaptured violations is explicitly and implicitly characterized as a civil,
230
non-punitive penalty.
However, the widespread public dissent against these automated
infraction detectors is not necessarily an uphill battle once the focus of
such challenges goes beyond individual constitutional analysis. Specifically, judicial attention must be had for the actual realities of the
internal affairs underlying the use of automated traffic systems.
As a general trend, most challenges have focused on legislation,
which, on its face, remains silent as to the use of private companies
contracted to undertake the functions specifically delegated to local
authorities, not to private entities. In this context, challenges to the
red-light cameras will remain relatively unsuccessful since both state
statute and local ordinances generally comport with the exercise of
police powers in the regulation and enforcement of traffic on state
highways, roads, and streets.
Nevertheless, the implementation of automated traffic infraction
systems and the consequential public disdain stemming therefrom
may be ameliorated by a legislative initiative to prohibit the use of

230

See discussion supra Part II.C.
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foreign companies conducting the tasks that lawfully belong within
the geographic and legal jurisdictions of local authorities.
Alternatively, the implementation of a statewide program
wherein the state legislature retains the right to regulate the use of
automated infraction detectors, ideally, under the sole supervision and
control of the Department of Transportation would ensure uniformity
and limit the opportunity for unfair or deceptive business dealings
between municipalities and private companies.
Ultimately, the introduction of innovative and cost-effective
means of promoting public health, safety, and welfare is rapidly developing, and although the legal debate surrounding such innovations
quickly gains momentum as the technologies become more widespread, the articulation of standards set forth through coherent, consistent, and cohesive jurisprudence develops at a substantially slower
pace.
All in all, the use of automated traffic infraction detectors will
remain a familiar fixture of state-run thoroughfares. However, if the
current trend of local authorities contracting their police powers to
private companies outside the state continues, the exercise of unbridled discretion incidental to an outright delegation of local authority
will continue to exacerbate the tension created between the use of
such innovative technologies and the lack of public acceptance.
Although the legislature is currently debating the repeal of the
Traffic Safety Act altogether, this is merely a reflection of legislative
frustration with the ever-growing public outcry against the automated
systems. Rather than throwing in the towel on automated traffic infraction detectors, legislative attention must be had for the most efficient means of regulating these systems in a uniform and consistent
manner while limiting the possibility for privatizing and outsourcing
traffic regulation and enforcement beyond state borders.

